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Abstract 
 
The EU has argued that some agricultural subsidies are needed to provide the optimal 
amount of externalities (both positive and negative) produced by agriculture.  The 
argument is that agriculture is “multifunctional” and externalities such as rural 
development and landscape would be underproduced, while some forms of pollution 
(such as nitrogen runoff) would be overproduced without government intervention.   
Meanwhile, the United States has raised the concern that multifunctionality is primarily 
an argument to transfer income to producers.   One way to try and determine how much 
of these non-commodity payments are directed to externalities and how much is 
intended to distribute income to producers is to analyze the variation of the programs 
among the different member states of the EU.  We estimate the degree to which 
environmental characteristics, agricultural characteristics and political economy 
variables determine the objective and amount of funding each member states uses to 
address environmental externalities (both positive and negative).  Results indicate that 
little of the variance in agri-environmental expenditure can be explained by the 
difference in negative externalities, neither is there clear evidence that the payments are 
substituting for traditional agricultural subsidies.  However, demand for environmental 
services and political variables seem to be the driving motivators behind a country’s 
decision to spend money on agri-environmental programs.   1
Introduction 
 
In the European Union, the interface between agriculture and environmental 
policy has received increasing attention in recent years, sharpened by ‘food scares’ 
such as BSE, Foot and Mouth Disease, and the safety of Genetically-Modified 
Organisms.  At the same time, the EU has experienced increasing pressure to liberalise 
agricultural trade and to remove production subsidies. One result has been the growth 
in agri-environmental programs (AEPs) which purportedly encourage environmentally 
sustainable production and rural development.  Other countries have responded 
sceptically to these programs, arguing that they are simply production subsidies in 
another guise.  The response of the European Commission is that AEPs address 
genuine externalities of agricultural production.  This paper compares the use of AEPs 
among member states over time to identify whether they are simply substitutes for 
traditional agricultural subsidies or are, as the EU claims, a means to encourage the 
optimal production of positive and negative externalities. 
 
Within the EU, agriculture and the environment are largely regarded as 
complements.  For example, the EU is concerned about the abandonment of land, and 
subsidises farmers to retain marginal pasture in cultivation.  Compared to their more 
targeted U.S. counterparts, such as the Conservation Reserve Program, EU programs 
may appear to lack focus. Not surprisingly, AEPs have been viewed with scepticism in 
some quarters (specifically in the United States), the concern being that they are just a 
more acceptable way of delivering subsidies to farmers.  An editorial in Agra Europe 
commented: “[the EU] has gone to enormous lengths to create, both domestically and 
internationally, the camouflage of ‘multifunctionality’ to justify the continuation and 
probable increase of expenditure of more than 40 billion a year on bolstering an industry 
which is quite capable of surviving without subsidies” (Agra Europe editorial, 9/28/2001). 
As the OECD notes,  “a key policy concern is to distinguish between agri-environmental 
measures that actually address market failures by internalising environmental 
externalities or ensuring the provision of public goods associated with agriculture, from 
policies that appear to be merely labelled ‘green’ and used as a means of disguised 
protection” (OECD, 2003).  The same report later notes that “environmental payments 
are a statistically significant determinant of agricultural production and trade.”  The EU, 
in contrast, argues that their programs are addressing legitimate externalities demanded 
by its citizens.   
 
In this paper, we use econometric techniques to test whether EU agri-
environmental programs are in response to specific externalities or, alternatively, 
whether they are substitutes for more traditional forms of agricultural support. The 
question we are trying to answer is: why did European member states begin an 
unprecedented switch of production subsidies to payments for the non-marketed 
environmental public goods of agriculture? We want to better understand the internal 
political bargain that led to this change.   
 
Discovering the true motivation has several important implications for Canadian 
agricultural policy. First, AEPs are likely to change producer behaviour and production   2
patterns in the EU. Second, the use by the EU of the Green Box sets an important 
precedent (Ervin, 1999).  Usage of the Green Box may well increase as other nations 
become attracted to the use of AEPs, including the United States and Canada.   Last, 
understanding the political tradeoffs associated with these programs will give us insight 
into the feasible outcomes of trade negotiations.  If AEPs and other Rural Development 
Programs are acting as substitutes for price supports, making further cuts in direct 
subsidies may be facilitated by generous rules around the WTO’s Green Box.  However, 
if these programs are not substitutes, but an additional subsidy going to a new claimant 
group, tighter rules to encourage targeting, for example, may constrain the negative 
production effects while maximising the environmental benefits produced.  
 
  To help define possible motivations we have constructed four ‘lenses’ each of 
which represents a particular motivation for the AEPs.  Each lens represents a specific 
political bargain, with its own implications for production and possible trade agreements.  
We use the four lenses to help explain the results of our econometric analysis; a person 
looking through one particular lens would expect to see expenditures on the programs 
correlated with various explanatory variables in specific ways.  If we observe those 
correlations, then we can assign some validity to the lens. It should be noted that none 
of the lens has an exclusive command. The motivations behind EU policy are likely to 
be mixed, and there may be motivations of which we remain unaware. While all or none 
of the lenses might project the ‘right’ view, this does not diminish the importance of 
investigating the motivation, and from this determining the dominant policy-making 
group.  In particular, understanding the nature of the political bargain and the lobbies 
that have the most influence will allow us to make some predictions regarding the 
potential effects of various trade bargains, such as new WTO rules.  
 
  In this paper we discuss the implications for Canada and for future trade 
agreements by examining four possible motivations for AEPs in Europe. Each 
motivation is represented by a lens. To begin we provide some background to AEPs, 
and then discuss the stakeholders in the decision-making process and the associated 
lenses. We present various hypotheses associated with each of the lenses and then 
test these hypotheses econometrically using data on AEP expenditure.  The results are 
discussed in terms of the trade implications for Canada, and our conclusions end the 
paper. 
 
The European Approach to Agri-environmental Programs  
 
The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been at the heart of the 
European Community since its inception in the chaos and food insecurity of post-war 
Europe (Judt, 2005).  It has been seen as a guarantee of productivity and also as a 
common thread joining different nations together. However, CAP production subsidies 
and improved productivity have led to spoilage, high storage costs, and overseas 
‘dumping’. By 1973, the CAP accounted for 80 per cent of the budget of the European 
Community but by 2000 it had declined to 40 percent (Federico, 2005).  In a speech in 
New Zealand, the EU Agricultural Commissioner succinctly commented, ‘healthy 
production became overproduction, and the associated level of public spending became   3
a problem’ (Fischer Boel, 2006). A combination of public dissatisfaction with the 
wastage of the CAP, the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states, and pressure 
from EU trading partners, especially during the Uruguay Round, made change 
inevitable. One solution might have been to continue in the old production-supporting 
way, but to deny this assistance to farmers in the newly-acceding member states. This 
approach would have been contrary to the commonality of EU policy and very hard to 
justify to other agriculture-exporting states. The only other route was to reduce the price 
supports. This latter route was taken, providing the EU with a range of ways in which to 
implement the reductions.  
 
In considering these, it is important to bear in mind the considerable influence 
which agricultural lobby groups still have in decision-making at both the member state 
and EU level. Despite its apparent decline in economic importance, accounting for only 
single digit figures of GDP for most EU-15 member states, the agricultural lobby 
remains influential (Keeler, 1996). 
 
The process of integrating conservation into agricultural policy is hardly new, but 
prior to 1992 such integration took place primarily at the member state level. In addition, 
concerns over agriculture’s damage to the natural environment tended to come from 
northern concerns (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
northern Italy), while southern concerns tended be over rural depopulation and 
especially land abandonment (France, the Alpine countries, southern Italy, Spain, 
Portugal).  Early measures included the northern-led EC 795/85 of 1985 which 
permitted member states to fund agri-environmental incentive schemes in 
environmentally-sensitive areas, the areas to be defined by the states. The schemes 
were taken up by the northern states, especially Britain and Germany, but most 
southern states took little action  (Dabbert et al., 1998; Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001; 
Brouwer and Van der Straaten, 2002).
1 
 
The shortcomings of EC 795/85 were addressed in EC 2078/92, the agri-
environmental regulations introduced as part of the 1992 ‘MacSharry Reforms’ of EU 
agricultural policy.  The regulation is noteworthy for providing financing from the 
‘guarantee’ section of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF), putting agri-environmental schemes on the same financial footing as the 
CAP. EC 2078/92 made mandatory the introduction of agri-environmental programmes 
across all states and addressed the socio-economic concerns, especially over land 
abandonment and rural depopulation, of the southern states (Baldock et al., 1996). 
Other 'additional measures', dating from the 1992 MacSharry Reforms, are money for 
the early retirement of farmers, compensatory measures to support farmers in 
mountainous or environmentally challenging regions (Least Favoured Areas or LFAs), 
and measures to support forestry. Each additional measure requires some co-financing 
from member-states, the share varying by region. Finally, by allowing all land, and not 
just environmentally-sensitive land, to be included in agri-environmental schemes, the 
regulation provided a strong basis for paid stewardship across the community, as well 
as giving all farmers possible access to subsidies through AEPs. 
                                                 
1  For example, Portugal did not even bother to translate the text.   4
The process of policy integration and decoupling was continued in the Agenda 
2000 reforms which developed two ‘pillars’ within the EAGGF. Pillar 1 contains funding 
for production support, still the great majority of the money. Pillar 2 contains funding for 
Rural Development Regulations (RDRs) which are activities undertaken by member 
states to improve their rural areas. Agri-Environmental Programmes form part of RDRs, 
and take up the largest share of RDR money, as figure 1 indicates.  Other typical RDR 
expenditures go to farmer early retirement, training programmes, and afforestation 
(MAFF, 2000).  Further reforms took place in 2003, including making ‘modulation’ 
compulsory. The EC now requires member states to transfer a percentage of Pillar 1 
money to Pillar 2. The transfer from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 will grow to a minimum of five per 
cent, although member states may transfer more if they wish.  In 2005, ‘cross-
compliance’ became compulsory after being voluntary and somewhat ineffective 
(Osterburg, 2004). This means that farmers receiving Pillar 1 money must keep their 
land at Good Farming Practice (GFP) standard. Very few farmers could continue 
without Pillar 1 money, and so GFP is binding in practice. However, as far as we know, 
no farmer has been charged with not meeting the GFP minimum as of the time of 
writing.  Further, some studies of cross-compliance have shown that the results are not 
necessarily optimal because of the costs of compliance with GFP to farmers on 
marginal and erodible land. The risk of land abandonment increases with the costs of 
maintaining GFP, reflecting the need, in the views of some writers, for a more site-
specific calculation of AEPs. Varelo-Ortega and Calatrava,, (2004) summarize the 
complexities of cross-compliance especially in relation to water conservation in the 
Mediterranean, but also to northern member states. 
 
Brussels co-finances RDRs with member states at a maximum of 85 per cent for 
Objective 1 areas, and 60 per cent for Objective 2 areas, these maximums were 
increased in the 2003 reforms from 75 and 50 percent respectively (EC, 2006).   
Objective 1 areas are the economically poorer parts of the region (EC, 2006). Member 
states are at liberty to design RDRs as they wish, and to decide on levels of funding in 
accordance with their ranking of requirements, but they are constrained to include 
AEPs, which  are the sole ‘compulsory measure’, reflecting the importance given to 
them by Brussels.
2  The variation in types and amount of expenditure among member 
states is very large, as shown in tables 1 and 2. It is also worth noting that member 
states with the most pressing agri-environmental problems, such as the Netherlands 
with the highest nutrient run-off in the EU, do not spend the most. 
 
To summarise, AEPs are co-financed by Brussels as part of RDRs, which aim to 
revitalise rural economies and conserve the natural environment. Because of the wide 
range of values attached to such concepts, member states are free to choose the policy 
mix which best suits their particular requirements. Decisions in some countries are 
taken at the regional level, in line with the EU ‘subsidiarity’ concept, which requires 
decision-making at the lowest feasible level. This is in contrast to the CAP budget, 
which is decided at the EC level by representatives from the member states who, 
naturally enough, can be expected to lobby for their specific national  interests.  The key  
                                                 
2 At the farmer level there is no cost-sharing, and all programmes are voluntary.   5
Figure 1. Allocations from the EAGGF (AEM’s provide the legislative framework 
and EU funding for AEPs) 
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AEPs and the EU Budget
 
Table 1: Types of AEPs by Member State in 2002 
 
 
Source: DEFRA (2002). Shaded areas indicate policy adoption.   6
Table 2.  Average Agriculture and Agri-environmental Expenditure by Country,  






as % of total EU 
Agricultural 
Expenditure 
Belgium and Luxembourg  8.9  1109  0.9 
Denmark 9.7  1262  0.8 
Germany 263.6  5363  5.7 
Greece 6.1  2648  0.2 
Spain 65.7  5137  1.2 
France 145.27  9110  1.6 
Ireland 82.2  1694  4.7 
Italy 139.2  4669  2.9 
Netherlands 8.6  1573  0.6 
Austria 230.8  740  27.9 
Portugal 53.4  696  7.4 
Finland 118.3  516  21 
Sweden 80.2  565  12.7 
UK 46.5  3720  1.2 
 
Source: EC, Eurostat and authors’ calculations 
 
 
goals for southern states are prevention of land abandonment and the retention of the 
rural population; this is why the early agri-environmental measures meant little to them. 
Northern states, which tend to be richer and less dependent on agriculture’s contribution 
to GDP, place more emphasis on the ‘lifestyle’ and amenity value of the countryside. A 
consensus for the two groups would be to treat the problem of what to do with 
agriculture post decoupling as a ‘stewardship’ issue. In the next section we examine 
these concepts more fully, making use of our four ‘lenses’. 
 
European Agri-environmental Programs and the Four Lenses 
 
We propose four hypothesized scenarios that may have given rise to AEPs: the 
first two represent the motivation to address externalities, and can therefore result from 
a motivation to improve welfare; whereas the last two imply that AEPs are a result of a 
political bargain that faces certain financial or trade constraints.  There has been 
increasing concern about the negative externalities produced by the intensification of 
agriculture within Europe (Baldock et al., 2002; Pretty et al., 2001). Thus, one motivation 
for AEPs may be to limit the negative externalities of agriculture, such as nutrient run-off 
and loss of bird habitat; this is the ‘pollution’ lens.  If AEPs are payments to limit the 
production of negative externalities, then they maybe welfare-improving.  
   7
When justifying its agri-environmental policy, the EU makes the argument that 
agriculture produces a number of public goods that have value to EU citizens. To 
ensure these goods are not underproduced, farmers need to be rewarded for the 
production of positive externalities, such as attractive rural scenery; this is our ‘green 
consumer’ lens.  As much as these goods are truly externalities and demanded by 
citizens, a targeted program aimed at their delivery may also be welfare-improving.  
 
Third, the EU has been forced by over-production and enlargement to reduce the 
agricultural budget, and it may be using AEPs as compensation to farmers who have 
lost production subsidies. This is our ‘budget bargain’ lens. Fourth, there is the ‘cynical’ 
lens that reflects the view that the United States is correct in suggesting that AEPs are 
merely converted price supports, and that nothing has really changed in Brussels. Both 
of these lenses represent a political bargain, and therefore do not imply a social 
optimum.  Despite their similarity, there are substantive differences between the budget 
and the cynical lenses.  In the case of the budget bargain lens, the AEPs are a result of 
the government trying to address the concerns of environmentalists and consumers 
while facing the joint constraints of the CAP budget and maintaining some support level 
for farmers.  On the other hand, in the cynical lens, AEPs are purely a result of the 
agricultural lobby addressing constraints on agricultural subsidies imposed by the WTO.  
Thus, in the cynical lens, environmentalists and consumers have no (or little) influence 
in the outcome of agricultural policy. 
  
Table 3 illustrates the form support for each lens would take in the econometric 
analysis of AEP uptake by member state. For example, if you were of a cynical mind 
and thought that the EU was using AEPs as converted price supports, then you would 
expect that green demand for cleaner water and greater biodiversity, for example, would 
not affect the uptake of AEPs; or, if the agricultural production supported by the CAP is 
inherently environmentally harmful, and these payments are intended to go to those 
same producers who received payments under the CAP, the payments may even be 
negatively correlated with pollution.  Second, since the objective is to transfer income to 
producers, one would anticipate that rules that place constraints on payments (such as 
cross-compliance) would be negatively correlated with AEP expenditure. 
 
  The pollution lens: The negative externalities of agriculture are well-known in 
Europe, perhaps because for most Europeans farming is carried on within an hour’s 
drive. Non-point source pollution of ground water, ‘spray-drift’, and the loss of 
hedgerows are widely discussed, especially after the foot and mouth, dioxin, and BSE 
crises. Several scholars, such as Jules Pretty, have published widely accessible books 
on the subject, drawing attention to the ‘true costs’ of intensive agriculture (Pretty, 1998; 
Pretty et al., 2000; Pretty et al., 2001). As a result of this attention, which is by no 
means restricted to northern states, reducing pollution has become a legitimate issue, 
although sometimes difficult for the EU to police. For example, the Nitrate Directive of 
1991 has still not been fully enforced, and infringement proceedings are underway 
against some member states for lack of compliance (EC, 2006). Perhaps because of its 
relative weakness, the EU seems to prefer the carrot to the stick (Schramek et al., 
1999), designing AEPs that reduce inputs and thus encourage beneficial outputs, rather    8
Table 3.  Expected Correlation of Agri-environmental Payments with Observed 
Characteristics as Seen Through the Four Lenses 
 
  Characteristics 

























0 +  + + - 0 
Green 
Demand 
+ 0  + +  0/+  - 
Budget  
Bargain 
0/+ 0/-  0/+  -  -  + 
Cynical 0  -  -  -  +  + 
 
 
than restrict harmful outputs directly.  As can be seen in table 1, the EU does have 
some programs that address negative externalities, but these are often linked to 
encouraging farm processes that are seen to produce positive externalities as well. For 
example, organic farming is encouraged as a way of controlling nitrate leaching, instead 
of a program that pays producers to directly reduce nitrate leaching, regardless of the 
technique used. It is noteworthy that organic farming is, as indicated in table 1, the only 
measure common to all member states. The view through the pollution lens is therefore 
not clear; certainly the EU is reducing pollution by encouraging less intensive cultivation, 
but it is not possible to claim that this is the over-riding motivation behind AEPs.  
 
The viewer through the pollution lens would not expect that AEPs were affected 
by green demand, exercised through for example rural tourism; that is, there may well 
be green demand, but the EU is not responding to this when designing AEPs. The same 
viewer would expect AEPs to be affected by agricultural pollution levels, indicated by 
variables such as pesticide use, nutrient run-off and also the intensity of production, 
given by farm size and equipment. Environmental influence is indicated in its national 
voting structure. This viewer would expect this set of variables to have an influence; 
AEPs would reduce pollution. The viewer would also expect cross-compliance to have 
an improving effect because of its compulsory nature and its constraint on virtually all 
producers, as discussed above. The same viewer might have a somewhat jaundiced 
view of the agricultural lobby, and regard the spread of AEPs as indicating a weakening 
of the agricultural lobby, indicated by variables such as number employed in agriculture. 
For similar reasons, ‘reducing pollution’ would expect a change in the claimant group, 
that is money is moving away from the producers who have previously received 
agricultural subsidies. 
   9
The green demand lens:  The EU argues, on behalf of the green taxpayer, that 
non-marketed outputs will suffer if agricultural support prices are reduced by trade 
liberalisation without compensation for positive externalities. The EU position is 
supported by a variety of empirical evidence indicating Europeans genuinely value such 
environmental services (Drake, 1992; Hackl and Pruckner, 1997; Schmid et al., 2006). 
Surveys by Eurobarometer have shown a consistently high appreciation for the work of 
farmers in cultivating the landscape (EC, 2004).   Allied to the wish to preserve scenic 
landscapes are those AEPs designed to lessen the abandonment of farmland in the EU. 
Land abandonment has been a particular concern for some southern member states, 
such as Spain and Portugal (Baldock et al., 1996)  but also for northern member states 
such as Austria.  Agri-tourism is a developing business and rural tourists in Europe 
prefer to see neatly cultivated land farmed under a low intensity regime (Hackl and 
Pruckner, 1997).  Extensification is therefore encouraged, underlined by the Single 
Farm Payment scheme which subsidises farmers even if no crop is produced (EC, 
2005). Farmers do however have to keep subsidised land in ‘good agricultural condition’ 
which means, for example, no afforestation (Schmid et al., 2006).  The viewer through 
the green demand lens would expect, naturally enough, that green demand, expressed 
through for example domestic tourism and population density, would be positive; the EU 
is responding to expressed demand for environmental amenities, better facilities for 
bird-watching etc.  
 
Both the pollution reducing and green demand lens imply that the AEPs may be 
welfare-improving for the EU.  From a trade perspective, the primary concern would not 
be to limit these types of payments, but instead to ensure that they minimise any trade-
distorting side-effects.  For example, if by paying producers to expand the quantity of 
pasture, AEPs result in larger quantities of cattle produced, this might be of concern to 
trading partners.  Further, the subsidized increase in the quantity of organics may 
decrease the premium faced by exporters of organic produce in other countries. Of 
particular concern may be those subsidies that pay for activities that producers would 
have taken in any case.   However, if some of these externalities are difficult to target 
directly, requiring that countries focus exclusively on measurable environmental outputs, 
welfare may be reduced.    
 
The budgetary lens: The EU has argued that one important reason for the 
original development of Pillar 2 was the combination of the high costs of production 
support under Pillar 1, and the continuing expansion of the EU (Fischer Boel, 2006).  
Thus, AEPs and RDRs potentially have been introduced as a politically feasible way to 
reduce price supports.  Pillar 2, and hence AEPs, can thus be seen as a way for the EU 
to lower agricultural output and thereby reduce spending on production subsidies. The 
reduction of production subsidies is particularly important as the EU expands to 27 
members, some of whom maintain large agricultural sectors. Decoupling is then a 
matter of reducing the CAP budget, but at the same time giving farmers some 
consolation in the form of AEPs. Although not necessarily geared to providing positive 
externalities, presumably the government would be interested in harnessing the support 
of green consumers for the CAP reforms.  The viewer through the budgetary lens is 
expecting that environmentalists and consumers of the countryside, that is the first three   10
columns of Table 3, are expressing some influence, but would expect the AEP money to 
go to the same claimant group previously receiving CAP subsidies to smooth the 
transition. 
 
The cynical lens: The cynical lens projects the view that AEPs are merely 
converted price supports, and that the EU has repackaged its production subsidies 
under another name in order to put them into the Green Box. The cynical viewer would 
therefore expect that green demand would have no influence.. You would however 
expect both the agricultural lobby and the same claimant group to have positive 
correlations. If you thought that AEPs were price supports by another name, then this 
money is flowing to the same groups that previously received price supports --reflecting 
the powerful influence of the agricultural lobby.  Second, one would anticipate that the 
larger the past agricultural expenditure, the larger a proportional use of AEPs, to ensure 
that these producers are not being harmed by the switch from one tool to another. 
 
Stakeholders in Agri-environmental Program Decision-making 
 
The lenses can be thought of as reflecting varying levels of influence of different 
stakeholder groups.  Table 1 indicates the wide diversity of AEPs within the EU; even 
countries which appear to have similar agricultural characteristics offer very different 
programs. Access to the political decision-making processes rather than natural 
endowments may therefore provide some insights into motivation and therefore 
potential future changes with effects on trade. 
 
The various stakeholders whose cumulative influences lead each member state 
towards its own particular policy mix are: farmers; consumers, environmentalists; the 
non-farming rural population; taxpayers; and finally the central government. The relative 
access to decision-making and lobbying power of each stakeholder clearly varies 
between member states, and may help explain the differences in policy outcome. Keeler 
(1996) provides a good description of the continuing influence of the agricultural lobby in 
Brussels.  
 
Hypotheses and the Econometric Model 
 
As discussed above, an understanding of the motivations behind AEPs leads to 
the identification of the dominant policy-making group, and thereby the potential impact 
for trade agreements and Canadian trade.  We now consider and explicitly test four 
hypotheses related to the supply and demand of AEP’s: 
 
(1) is it driven by the supply of negative externalities, (consistent with the pollution lens 
and the budget bargain lens); 
(2)  is it driven by the demand for positive externalities, (consistent with the green 
demand lens and the budget bargain lens); 
(3) is it related to the amount of CAP subsidies from the previous year, (consistent with 
the budget bargain and cynical lens); and,    11
(4) is it affected by the political-institutional structure (consistent with the budget bargain 
and the cynical lens). 
 
Our analysis uses three separate regressions by year by member-state, as 
shown in tables 5-7, using different dependent variables. Table 5 shows the results from 
a regression using AEP funding from Brussels as a share of total agricultural 
expenditure; in table 6 the dependent variable is total agricultural expenditure; and 
finally in table 7 the dependent variable is RDR funding as a share of total agricultural 
funding. The time-series is from 1993 to 2003 (excluding 1999 due to missing data on 
AEP expenditure for that year) against a range of variables that reflect preexisting 
pollution problems, consumer demand and agricultural characteristics. We have also 
included political variables, such as voting structure and the different political levels 
within member states at which funding is allocated to capture political infuence. Belgium 
and Luxembourg’s statistics have been amalgamated. We were not able in all cases to 
obtain data for every year for every member state, and so have had to make 
appropriate adjustments.  Because of missing data (on farm size), Spain is effectively 
removed from the sample.  However, when farm size is removed from the regression, 
the results remain virually unchanged.   The percentage of agricultural expenditure 
going to AEPs was estimated using a panel regression with random effects, correcting 
for heteroskedasticity within the groups.
3 
 
To represent the supply of negative externalities from agricultural production, we 
include the amount of pesticides used (measured by kilograms of active ingredient) per 
hectare and the nitrogen surplus.  We also include the percent of agricultural land that is 
in permanent pasture as a measure of the extensification of production.  All of these 
variables are lagged to reflect pre-existing conditions and address concerns with 
endogeneity.  If  agri-environmental programs are indeed  intended to reduce intensive 
farming practices, they will presumably be targeted at those regions with the highest 
degree of intensive agriculture.  Population density is included to capture how sensitive 
the general population may be to agriculturally-produced pollution.  
  
  To proxy the demand for the positive externalities produced by agriculture, we 
use the amount of domestic tourism.  We also include a ranking based on a report by 
the European Environmental Agency which graded European countries on their 
integration of environmental protection into domestic legislation and practice (EEA 
2005).   Scores from 1 to 5 indicate these results, with 5 being strongest.
4 Education of 
the population and access to information will also affect demand for environmental 
amenities.  To capture this effect, we use access to the Internet in terms of number of 
                                                 
3 (Heteroskedasticity was found to be a problem.  Using a likelihood ratio test, we could reject 
homoskedasticity with a probability of 00.0, with a test statistic of 268.08 with 12 degrees of freedom).  
Panel specific autocorrelation was tested for, and the differences in the standard errors were found to be 
insignificant (the likelihood ratio test found that the hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected with 
a p-stat of 0.29) 
4 The EEA graded Denmark ‘weak’ but this seemed incorrect because before its conservative government 
Denmark had been considered a leader in environmental matters (Liefferink and Anderson, 1998).  Thus, 
Denmark was ranked a 5.  
   12
connections per thousand inhabitants. Our data source is the World Bank. Unfortunately 
we are unable to separate rural from urban internet users.  Last, we include GDP per 
capita to capture the effect of income. 
 
A number of variables capture the political strength of the farm sector.  The 
lagged CAP expenditure is included to provide the effect of past production subsidies.  If  
agri-environmental expenditure is simply a means of delivering agricultural subsidies, 
those regions with the highest agricultural expenditure will convert a larger percentage 
of their direct subsidies to AEPs.  To capture the overall size of the agricultural sector, 
we include the portion of the population that is working in agriculture.  We also include 
the average farm size. 
 
 The relationship between AEPs and cross-compliance is captured  by taking into 
account whether the member state had cross-compliance rules in place, thus requiring 
that farmers meet certain minimum practices before receiving other agricultural funding.  
If the country uses cross-compliance, producers may demand more agri-environmental 
funding as compensation, or, at a minimum, may be less resistant to transferring price 
support to environmental payments, since in either case they have to undertake some 
level of environmentally-friendly production practices. On the other hand, cross-
compliance rules indicate that the agricultural lobby was unable to block restrictions 
being placed on its other sources of funding. 
 
Those rural residents who are not immediately involved in agriculture may not 
have the same preferences as their farming neighbours, so we also include the percent 
of the population living in the rural area.  If these are recent migrants to the rural area 
and not reliant on agricultural prices for their income, they may want to see funds 
transferred from direct price supports to AEPs to reduce pollution and provide positive 
externalities.  However, if they do rely on the agricultural sector for their livelihood, such 
as by working in the input or processing sector, they may be concerned with the 
reduction in purchased inputs and production that may result from this change in 
subsidies. 
 
Last, we include a number of political variables, such as the percent of seats 
elected using proportional representation, and whether the Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) are elected by region or nationally.  These variables are intended to 
capture the “voice” of the various lobby groups. The Proportional Representation (PR) 
system allows smaller parties, such as the Green Party, a voice. Therefore PR   
represents more of the influence of the environmental groups and less of the traditional 
lobbies, such as agriculture, which tend to be well represented by the traditional political 
parties. In contrast, regional voting would presumably strengthen the voice of 
geographic lobbies such as agricultural and rural interests.  Summary statistics are 
presented in table 4.
5,6   
 
                                                 
5 The sources of the data are the EU (Eurostat), the FAO,  the OECD, and the World Bank. 
6 We also included dummy variables  representing various country groupings (for example, South versus 
North, Scandenavian), but they were not found to be significant.   13







    
Agri-environmental programs as % of total agricultural 
Expenditure  134 5.71  8.97 
Green Index (1=low, 5=high)  154  2.50  1.35 
Domestic tourism (t-1)  119  4.91  3.09 
Internet 150  1.65  1.63 
Pesticide concentration (kgs AI per ha, t-1)  137  4.61  3.59 
Nitrogen surplus (t-1)  137  74.09  62.17 
Percentage permanent grassland (t-1)  150  17.82  13.22 
Percentage of population that is rural (t-1)  140  23.97  12.58 
Percentage of workforce in agriculture (t-1)  134  6.26  4.81 
Population density (pop per km2)  140  147.20  115.29 
Farm Size (t-1)  127  17.06  12.49 
Cross compliance in place  154  0.57  0.50 
CAP funding (t-1)  154  2.69  2.44 
Percentage of MEPs elected using Proportional 
Representation  154 0.71  0.41 
MEPs elected regionally (1) or nationally (0)  154  0.46  0.48 
GDP per capita  154  20.72  6.53 
 





Overall, agri-environmental expenditure seemed to be negatively correlated with 
the pre-existing pollution, but positively correlated to demand (see regression results in 
table 5).   Thus, countries with more intensive farming practices, whether that was 
represented by less permanent pasture, or a greater use of pesticides or nitrogen 
balance, spent less on agri-environmental measures than their more extensive 
counterparts.  Thus, the countries that conceivably have the largest production of 
negative externalities  are investing the least amount of money in changing their 
production.  This result is consistent with the intuition that those farmers who lose the 
least productivity by adopting AEPs will be the most likely to adopt the programs.  Thus, 
farmers with established intensive production technology are more reluctant to give up 
their comparative advantage (and price supports), while those farmers who are already 
farming extensively do not mind being funded to become more so.   Those countries 
with higher population densities had a lower percentage of AEP expenditure.  Thus, if 
there are fewer hectares per person, which might be thought to make pollution problems   14
more pressing (or at least more immediate), the lower the funding to decrease these 
problems. 
 
Table 5.  Regression Results Using Agri-environmental Program Expenditures as 
Percent of Total Agricultural Expenditures 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error  p-stat
      
Green Index (1=low, 5=high)  2.58  0.87  0.00 
Domestic tourism (t-1)  0.35  0.19  0.07 
Internet 0.94  0.28  0.00 
Pesticide concentration (kgs AI per ha, t-1)  -0.66  0.24  0.01 
Nitrogen surplus (t-1)  -0.06  0.02  0.00 
Percentage permanent grassland (t-1)  0.46  0.11  0.00 
Percentage of population that is rural (t-1)  0.23  0.07  0.00 
Percentage of workforce in agriculture (t-1)  -1.28  0.28  0.00 
Population density (pop per km2) -0.03  0.01  0.00 
Farm Size (t-1)  -0.36  0.08  0.00 
Cross compliance in place  -1.82  1.08  0.09 
CAP funding (t-1)  0.38  0.26  0.14 
Percentage of MEPs elected using Proportional 
Representation  20.30 5.02  0.00 
MEPs elected regionally (1) or nationally (0)  0.19  2.31  0.93 
GDP per capita  -0.19  0.14  0.17 
      
Constant -1.51  7.62  0.84 
Log likelihood  -177.78   
Number of Observations  82   
Number of countries included  13   
 
 
If a country used cross-compliance, that country was more likely to spend a 
smaller percent of its agricultural budget on AEPs (although the coefficient was only 
significant at the ten percent level).  Thus, those countries that imposed restrictions on 
CAP payments first were slower to adopt AEPs.  Thus, it seems as if cross-compliance 
and AEPs were acting as substitutes rather than complements, with the implication that 
AEPs were not being used as a means to compensate producers for regulations. 
 
In terms of demand, there is reasonably strong evidence that countries with a 
greater demand for environmental goods spend more of their agricultural budget on the 
environment.  The more “environmental” the government, as measured by our 
constructed green index, discussed above, the greater the agri-environmental 
expenditure as a portion of total expenditure.  Access to the Internet, a proxy for access   15
to information, was related to a greater portion of expenditure on AEPs.  Last, a greater 
amount of domestic tourism also increased the agri-environmental expenditure, perhaps 
indicating that there are some perceived positive externalities produced by agriculture 
that are demanded by a populace that enjoys visiting rural areas.  Further, the greater 
the population density, the lower the expenditure on AEPs.  Thus, there is an indication 
that AEPs are not going to areas where many people may be affected by regional 
pollution, nor are they being used purely to block sprawl. The coefficient of GDP per 
capita was not significant.
7 
 
It is notable that while those countries with a larger portion of their population 
living in rural areas spent more of their agricultural funding on AEPs,  those with a larger  
percentage of their population employed in agriculture spent less.  This apparently 
contradictory result can be explained by noting that members of the rural population not 
involved with agriculture have an incentive to increase tourism and decrease the 
pollution associated with agriculture.  However, people employed in agriculture are likely 
to benefit from commodity price supports, and may be concerned to see the transfer of 
funds from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2. 
 
More predictably, those countries with smaller farms spent a higher portion of 
their agricultural expenditure on AEPs.  Farmers with smaller holdings may not receive 
the same amount of traditional subsidies as their larger counterparts, and therefore may 
be more willing to use agri-environmental expenditure that may be more accessible to 
them.  For example, some AEPs  subsidise the use of traditional farming  practices, 
which tend to require a greater labour to land input ratio, which often results in a smaller 
farmed acreage. 
 
The results are inconclusive about the effect of historical agricultural expenditure 
on the degree of funding going to AEPs.  Although the coefficient is positive, it is not 
significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.  Along with the above results on 
farm size, there is evidence that those producers receiving AEPs are not the same as 
those who previously received CAP subsidies.  Therefore, there is mixed evidence on 
whether the AEPs are explicitly being used as a substitute for agricultural subsidies. 
 
Political structure does affect the degree of agri-environmental expenditure.   
Countries with proportional representation had a larger agri-environmental expenditure.  
Since PR in some countries has allowed smaller and newer parties such as the Green 
Party to gain standing in the legislature, this may be understandable.  The implication 
would seem to be that a system that allows a broader representation facilitates 
environmental expenditure.  Whether MEPs were elected regionally or only nationally 
seemed to have little effect. 
 
It is interesting to contrast these results to a regression using total agricultural 
expenditure (table 6) as the dependent variable.  Although CAP expenditures also seem 
correlated with some of the green demand variables (the green index and domestic 
                                                 
7 GDP per capita and GDP per capita
  squared were both tried to see if there was a non-linear effect of 
income.  However, the coefficients were individually and jointly insignificant at the five percent level.   16
tourism), those countries with more intensive farming (i.e. a greater use of pesticides 
and less permanent pasture) receive more CAP payments.  The indication that demand 
for environmental services is correlated with higher CAP payments may indicate that the 
population perceives that some positive externalities are produced by agriculture.  Not 
surprisingly however, CAP expenditure is higher in those countries with more intensive 
agriculture.  Thus, it makes sense that those producers with intensive production 
technologies are reluctant to see funding transferred from CAP to AEPs, which promote 
extensive production. 
 
Table 6.  Regression Results Using Total Agricultural Expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.    Error  p-stat 
      
Green Index (1=low, 5=high)  0.72  0.12  0.00 
Domestic tourism (t-1)  0.19  0.03  0.00 
Internet -0.02  0.04  0.64 
Pesticide concentration (kgs AI per ha, t-1)  0.08  0.04  0.06 
Nitrogen surplus (t-1)  0.00  0.00  0.30 
Percentage permanent grassland (t-1)  -0.11  0.02  0.00 
Percentage of population that is rural (t-1)  0.00  0.01  0.58 
Percentage of workforce in agriculture (t-1)  0.24  0.04  0.00 
Population density (pop per km2)  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Farm Size (t-1)  0.00  0.01  0.87 
Cross compliance in place  -0.95  0.33  0.00 
Percentage of MEPs elected using Proportional
Representation  -6.54 0.76  0.00 
MEPs elected regionally (1) or nationally (0)  1.19  0.28  0.00 
GDP per capita  0.05  0.03  0.06 
Constant 1.79  0.98  0.07 
Log likelihood  -12.01     
Number of Observations  94     
Number of countries included  13     
 
This regression included controls for panel specific heteroskedasticity and panel specific autocorrelation. 
 
The larger the rural population and the larger the portion of the population 
employed in agriculture, the larger the overall level of agricultural subsidies.  As 
anticipated above, the EU's traditional price-supports may aid those employed in 
agriculture, who may therefore lobby for CAP payments. The broader rural population 
may also gain, albeit more indirectly, from agricultural subsidies.  So, although the rural 
population may prefer AEPs, they may also demand CAP payments. 
 
Here, proportional representation did seem to matter, in that if a country had PR, 
it tended to have lower agricultural subsidies.  This result may indicate that the   17
traditional farm lobby has less influence under a PR system. Similarly, if a country has a 
system where MEPs are elected on a regional basis, they receive more agricultural 
subsidies than those that elect MEPs nationally.  Thus, a regional system may allow the 
farm lobby more influence than direct national elections. 
 
Last, a regression was run using the RDP payments as a percent of CAP 
expenditure to see if there was a difference in the RDP expenditure compared to the 
AEP component (see table 7 for results).  Since we only have RDP expenditure data for 
2000 to 2003, the regression for AEPs was re-run using this shorter time period (than 
the results reported in table 5), and the results are reported in table 7.  Most of the 
coefficients in the two regressions had the same signs, implying that the pressure for 
AEPs is similar to that for RDPs in total. 
 
Table 7.  Regression Results Using Rural Development Program Expenditure as a 
Percent of Agricultural Funding, 2000-2003 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error  p-stat 
      
Green Index (1=low, 5=high)  7.76  1.24  0.00 
Domestic tourism (t-1)  0.18  0.38  0.63 
Internet 0.35  0.61  0.57 
Pesticide concentration (kgs AI per ha, t-1)  -1.29  0.38  0.00 
Nitrogen surplus (t-1)  0.03  0.02  0.17 
Percentage permanent grassland (t-1)  0.82  0.14  0.00 
Percentage of population that is rural (t-1)  -0.17  0.02  0.00 
Percentage of workforce in agriculture (t-1)  -0.01  0.05  0.82 
Population density (pop per km2)  -4.04  0.90  0.00 
Farm Size (t-1)  -1.32  0.13  0.00 
Cross compliance in place  8.62  1.66  0.00 
CAP funding (t-1)  -0.03  0.40  0.94 
Percentage of MEPs elected using Proportional 
Representation  26.13 5.49  0.00 
MEPs elected regionally (1) or nationally (0)  -9.95  2.78  0.00 
GDP per capita  -2.11  1.61  0.19 
GDP per capita2  0.01  0.03  0.80 
Constant 84.04  30.05  0.01 
Log likelihood  -64.19     
Number of Observations  37     
Number of countries included  13     
 
This regression included controls for panel specific heteroskedasticity. 
Much of the green demand had the same effect (although the coefficients on 
tourism and Internet were not significantly different from zero). Interestingly, the 
percentage of the population living in the rural area no longer had an effect.  This   18
program is broad and directed at more aspects of rural development than agriculture, 
and so it is somewhat surprising that the relative size of the rural population had no 
influence.  Also interesting is that the regional election of MEPs decreased the funding 
going to RDRs relative to that going to agriculture.  Given that RDRs are there to aid 
certain (rural) regions, one might anticipate that regional representation would increase 
RDR funding.  Thus, this result may indicate that the agricultural lobby is able to have 
more influence in the regional elections than the broader rural lobby.    
 
Past CAP expenditure did not seem to affect the allocation of RDR funds, 
whereas in the last few years, those countries that were spending the most on CAP 
payments were also spending relatively more on AEPs.  Due to the modulation that 
became mandatory in 2005, one might anticipate that those countries with the larger 
CAP budgets would spend a higher portion of their funding on Pillar 2 expenditures, 
whereas we see them only spending more on AEPs.  GDP per capita did not have a 
significant effect, nor did GDP per capita squared, so the non-linear term was dropped 
from the final regression. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Below we summarize our results in terms of the four lenses we have used to 
illustrate possible motivations behind AEP provision. The  pollution lens, which   
suggests that AEPs are being used to reduce the negative externalities of agriculture, 
gains little support.  EU agri-environmental programs tend to be going to member states 
that already do what the programs encourage i.e., those that have to change their 
current technology and production patterns the least.  Specifically, those countries with 
the highest agricultural chemical intensity are spending the least on agri-environmental 
measures.  This result indicates that the largest potential gains of AEPs, in terms of 
reducing pollution, are being foregone 
 
On the other hand, the green demand lens, representing demand for agriculture's 
positive externalities, does receive qualified support. Those member states that are the 
most “green” seem to be spending the most on AEPs (relative to their overall 
agricultural expenditure).  Thus, the EU's contention that  CAP reforms are being 
demand-driven may be at least partially true. 
 
The third lens is 'budget bargaining', the hypothesis that AEPs are compensation 
to farmers for lost price supports. There is mixed evidence for this lens.  The fact that 
green demand seems to have an effect is consistent with the idea that politicians are 
garnering support for agricultural reforms.  One problem with this hypothesis however, 
is that much of green demand is also correlated with higher CAP payments, which 
would seem to imply that the attempt to garner support from these groups to reduce the 
CAP expenditures is not working.  There is evidence that the AEPs are being used as 
subsidies, but the problem is that they do not seem to be going to those who previously 
received the most under the CAP.   
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Last, support for the U.S. belief that AEPs are  farm subsidies in another guise is 
ambiguous.  If this were true, one would expect that those areas with the largest 
agricultural subsidies would also have the largest AEPs.  However it tends to be 
countries who receive smaller portions of the Pillar 1 of the CAP, such as Austria and 
Sweden, who are spending the most on AEPs.  Thus, the AEPs are not serving as a 
substitute for price supports, and are instead creating a new group of claimants.  Even 
though this finding diffuses the argument from other agricultural exporters, it does raise 
concerns for the EU, and its ability to use Pillar 2 payments as an incentive to reform 
the distortionary aspects of the CAP.  Perhaps this is part of the reason that increasing  
modulation has been meet with resistance in some member states. 
 
Although neither ‘political’ lens was unequivocally supported by our results, there 
is  strong evidence that political structure is affecting the outcome of AEP expenditure.  
This result implies that AEPs (and RDPs more generally) are the result of a domestic 
political bargain, and not just a simple social welfare maximization.  Therefore, when 
proposing constraints on agricultural subsidies through the WTO, the nature of this 
bargain must be considered.  Specifically, the EU must be allowed the flexibility to give 
incentives to the various players if one is to get them to move  (further) from the current 
subsidy regime. 
 
An implication of our results is that green taxpayers are now having some 
influence over EU agricultural policy, possibly at the expense of the traditional 
agricultural lobby.  For Canada, the relevance is that AEPs are unlikely to be reduced, 
and international pressure to limit their use may be counterproductive.  Indeed, the 
reduction in production output and distortionary subsidies which AEPs appear to 
achieve are to be welcomed. It remains possible that the EU might expand the use of 
AEPs, and perhaps more likely, of RDPs.  Should this occur, a suitable policy strategy 
might be to press for greater environmental targeting, for example greater site-
specificity in payments. Second, it may be possible to direct more of the funding to 
producers who need larger incentives to improve their farming practices with the use of 
an auction process, a practice successfully used in the Conservation Reserve Program 
in the United States and begun now for some AEPs in Britain. 
 
There is not overwhelming support for the cynical lens, but there is some 
indication that the agricultural lobby has lost a bit of its influence in setting the CAP 
agenda.  If this is true, there may be room for further reforms in EU agricultural policy 
with the appropriate external leverage.  That said, it seems as if budgetary concerns 
may have been a more pressing constraint than trade agreements.   
 
In any case, AEPs and RDPs provide useful examples of non-price support to 
agriculture, and Canada would be well-served to understand their effect. Given the 
current ascendancy and growing power of the 'green demand' lobby means that AEPs 
are here to stay, and that a possible course for Canada might be to learn from them and 
apply (a modified form) of them wherever conditions are suitable. 
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